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ABSTRACT
Budgeting process is like the "black box" which is known only by the executive 
alone. The game room was played beautifully, like a Dutch football game which is beautiful 
and interesting to watch, so that the budget seems to side with the people, but in fact the 
budget is an artificial reality. This study pictured the executive like “the prodigal son” who
marginalize the legislature. During the era of the new order, all the power over the budget is 
in the hands of the executive (the regent / mayor / governor) which is the extension of the 
central government (the president). 
This study employed critical ethnography method, which is described and interpret 
the cultural systems and social groups. As a research method, critical ethnography has the
typical process of a long observation of the social group that informants and researchers are 
active participant in the group. The finding of this study is that the executive-legislative 
relations agency in the context of budgeting process is like a mystery. The relationship of
agent in the budgeting process in the new order, was dominated by the executive agency. In 
this context legislative access to budget policy’s is very limited, or even, none at all.
INTRODUCTION
There is a crawl aspirations of the people, but who determines
the final result of the budget is the executive. People's 
aspirations did not affect the budget that has been made. This 
makes a very strong executive position, so that he himself would 
act arbitrarily, feudalistic, pretentious justification of its own
power and gain (Winasa, The Chief Executive of Jembrana)
So far "mystery" is the right word to express the agency relationship in the new order 
era of local government. In this era agency relationship full of conflicts of interest, secrecy 
and confidentiality, which is known only by the budget actors who are the executive. 
However, it was very naive when the agency relationship that raises many questions that only 
revealed the extent of surface, without any further exploring to the root of the problem. I 
think understanding to the source of problems is essential. This can be done by observing the 
behavior of actors interact in the budget process, through interviews with the actors of the 
time or the writings of many scattered reveal this. Another thing you can do is to understand 
the way of thinking or being part of the budget actors (both the executive and legislative). 
Also, it can also be done by collecting information about people's interpretation of executive-
legislative relations agency at that time. As expressed by Gillham (2004, 10) that in 
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qualitative research will be found a variety of evidence about what people say, what they do 
and how people perceive an action or event. Furthermore, he argued that the totality of the 
evidence could be the basis for researchers to explain the behavior of an agency relationship 
in accordance with an understanding of the budget actors.
This study employed critical ethnography method, which is described and interpret 
the cultural systems and social groups. This method is the result of the dialectical process, 
where at one point, there is dissatisfaction with the social class structure of society such as 
paternalism and racist, so that human in general as the main social actors cannot perform.
And the other point, there are representation of human in general by a specific class and race. 
As a research method, critical ethnography has the typical process of a long observation of 
the social group that informants and researchers are active participant in the group.
Researchers focus on the meaning of behavior, language and social interaction within the 
group. So that, researcher as a participant in the social group always critically examines the 
findings of the status quo that occurred in the group
In order to explore the facts of the new order era agency relationship, the data are 
useful and support the study, then analyzed with a holistic approach. As noted by
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, 10-11) that researchers can use different styles in analyzing 
the data obtained. Therefore, I use the evidence (the events) that are assembled into a
scientific story to reveal the agency relationship in the context of local government budgets.
The comprehension above shows that the budget management in the new order is like 
the "black box" which is known only by the executive alone. As said by Kade Sulastri, a 
member of the legislature, that "in those days the budget allocation is known only by
bureaucrats, while the public and the legislature was totally blind about the budget". "Black 
box" budget was the executive "game room", which because of the high self-interest, they
tend to impose the people. The game room was played beautifully, like a Dutch football
game which is beautiful and interesting to watch, so that the budget seems to side with the
people, but in fact the budget is an artificial reality (Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004).
This study pictured the executive like the prodigal son who marginalize the 
legislature. During the era of the new order, all the power over the budget is in the hands of
the executive (the regent / mayor / governor) which is the extension of the central 
government (the president). To be able to do so, all the laws are directed in such a way that
there is no room for other stakeholders to speak.
NEW ORDER ERA AGENCY RELATIONS: THE KINGDOM AND COLONIALISM 
REINCARNATION
As we know, the agency relationship in the context of the budget is always interesting 
to study, especially in the government sector with such a broad stakeholder. Because, in fact
the local government budget does not just belong to the executives, but also the interests of
politicians (legislature), the people, the central government and even the wider community. 
As said by Wildavsky and Caiden (2004, xxvii):
budgeting was interesting.  Amazing but true … budgeting was the lifeblood of government, the 
medium through which flowed the essentials life support systems of public policy.
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But it is really unbelievable that for thirty-two years the new order has been in power, the 
budget space was really only a mere executive realm. According to Winasa Gede, Jembrana
Regent, said, "at that time all parties (other stakeholders) is only taken for granted of what the 
will of the executive". Ironically, according to the Regent, "in the new order, bureaucrats
(executive) would only be served and would not serve, like a great lord in colonial or royal
past before Indonesia was proclaimed." This statement triggered the initiation of this study. 
Furthermore, based on instinct, observational study was initiated by doing a flashback by 
studying the behavior of the kingdom agency that affect executive-legislative interaction in
the New Order government.
As is known, in the 16th century before the arrival of foreigners, most of the regions 
of Indonesia consists of small countries that embrace the royal government system (Rahardja 
and Manurung, 2008: 345). At that time, the head of command was in the hands of the king
who is the sole and absolute authority. In other words, the king act and rule as if God's 
representatives on earth. Thus, all decisions was in the hands of the king and the people must 
abide and obey every command of the king. While on the other hand, the people or the people
trusted by the king had no right to change the decision of the king.
Agency relationship in the system began to appear when the king delegate some
authority to the officials or the royal regent. However, as a feudalistic system, royal officials
did not serve the public interest, but serve the interests of the king because the authority
received was the gift of the king and not from the people. It also occurs in Jembrana Bali. As 
is known, according to archaeological evidence can be interpreted that the emergence of
Jembrana community was around 6000 years ago. King and his followers are the people who
come from ethnic Balinese Hindus and ethnic non-Balinese who are Muslims have built a
palace as the seat of government named Puri Gede Jembrana in the early seventeenth century
by I Gusti Made Yasa (ruler of Brangbang). Since the royal power is held by the King of
Jembrana, I Gusti Gede Seloka, as happened in many other kingdoms in the archipelago, 
absolute rule was held by kings and nobility (www.jembrana.org.id).
The dominance of the nobility caste continues until the time of independence (ie the 
formation of the Indonesian state), just look at the list of names of former leaders (regent) of 
this area. Generally they come from the nobility such as Regent of Jembrana Autonomous 
Region Level II, for the first time chaired by Ida Bagus Gede Dosther from 1959 to 1967.
Furthermore, the government held by Drs. Ida Bagus Ardana (August 26, 1980 - August 27,
1990), then Regent Ida Bagus Indugosa, SH, who served for two terms starting from August 
27, 1990 - August 27, 1995 and from August 27, 1995 - August 27, 2000.
Again, this study has shown that these officials are from the nobility or priyayi group
that has high social status, which distinguishes them from other communities. This is due to
the power received from the king gave them a very important position to take the decisions
referred to as "elite" rulers (Suwarno, 1994: 10). With the honorable position of that of the
"elite", make their mental when implementing the government tends to behave like a king 
which is to be served. This has become the characteristic of the royal officials who can act at 
will against the people, as performed by the king.
Back to the past, many studies show mental feudalism continues to grow and flourish
in the Dutch colonial period. This is due to the focus of the Netherlands at the time was the 
smooth deposit of tax and tribute, not a mental improvements that affect the systems of 
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government officials. In addition, the proliferation of feudalism attitude is because they who 
are to govern during the colonial period generally comes from the nobility or from the priyayi
group. According to Dwiyanto (2006, 44), in the kingdom, the person appointed to be a royal
officials are the ones who have allegiance and loyalty to the king. In other words, if the 
officials are not loyal then it will be removed from office and replaced by someone more
loyal. Thus "monoloyalty" comes as an appreciation of the position, salary or reward which 
the king gives to his servants and a gift that can be withdrawn at any time by the king
(Suwarno, 1994).
According to Dwiyanto (2006, 12), officials "monoloyalty" at the time, measured by
seeing the king at the specified times, which is now better known as "face to face 
management ". They went to the king by presenting tributes and taxes that are drawn from
folk, where the offerings are to meet the needs of the king and royal family members. 
Suwarno (1994, 30) suggests that the authorities use the money withdrawn from the people
for the king's personal interests. Thus, the greater the tribute and taxes given the greater the 
king’s attention to the official because is considered very loyal (see research Dwiyanto, 
2006). Therefore, it can be said that this mental caused royal officials to be unaccountable to 
the public and away from public interests.
Other cultures that also affect the agency relationship in the context of the executive
and legislative budget during the new order in Indonesia is a culture of paternalism. The 
things that reflect the relationship of father and son (paternalism). In this cultural form by
Mulder (1985, 13), a subordinate with a superior position is equal with the position
relationship between the child with his father in the concept of Java. In this context, a child 
must honor his father manifested in polite speech, hesitate to oppose the will of his parents, 
and every action must receive the blessing of the father, while on the other hand, subordinates
receive protection from the father. According to Blau and Scott (1987), culture of paternalism
flourished because of the influence of feudalism, which had a big influence in shaping the
agency relationship in local governance.
CENTRALISTIC RELATIONSHIP: A NEW FORM FEUDALISM
In the period between 1966 until mid 1999 was a period in which the budget is in the
cage of centralization. Centralization cage is a new form of feudalism. In this case, the central 
government is a king, in which everyone must submit and adhere to all policies that are made,
including budget policy, is largely determined by the center (the President). Meanwhile, at
the regional level, the ruler is the extension of the central government statutory (Law) No.5 of 
1974 is the governor, regent or mayor. With a system of hierarchical organization, the regent
/ mayor is subordinated to the governor who is also subordinated to central government.
Therefore, in carrying out their duties, local authorities are under the supervision and control 
of the governor and the central government. The model hierarchy is consistent with the 
Weberian concept which says that the hierarchy of top officials has more power than the
officials at the level below. Based on the hierarchy system, then the lower hierarchy has no
authority to give opinions, suggestions, let alone against the power hierarchy above (see
Ahmad and Mansoor, 2002; Wibawa, 2005; Thoha, 2005). That is, executives, both in cities 
and counties, submissive and obedient to the governor and the central government.
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Likewise, the forms of agency relationship in the local government to follow the 
prevailing system, namely the executive and legislative work in order of hierarchy pattern, 
where the executive and legislative branch as the top leadership is below (Wibawa, 2005: 5). 
This social context, legitimated by Law No.5 of 1974 (UU No.5/1974), stated that the
legislature is part of the local government, which meant that the legislature is part of the
executive and not a separate entity from the government. This condition indicates that the 
executive is dominant (powerful). Meanwhile, the legislature and the people who are not
located within the hierarchy have no power (powerless) at all and is regarded as "alien". 
Jembrana Regent Gede Winasa commented that, "hierarchical lines from top to bottom, 
whether related to the powers and responsibilities, the tip was in the hands of the executive. 
The most powerful executives. "He continued that, "when a legislative act, just go with the 
flow controlled by the executive". This is new style feudalism phenomenon that appears in 
the form of centralization of power.
By instilling logo-centrism centralization, false consciousness developed against the 
dominated classes. This condition, according to Thomas Hobbes, is like a monster
"leviathan" that cannot be prevented from power authority. As Newton's law that requires a
world governed by a stable system, in which the regularities and the balance created due to
there is a power center that is universal and unchanging that govern them. This cosmological
analogy in the social system, required a centralized power, in which maintained social
stability and stable institutions (Piliang, 2005: 352).
During the reign of the new order with the Law No.5 in 1974 (UU No.5/1974) as the 
cornerstone of central and local relations, there have been injustice relations, both politically 
and economically. Politically, it seems that local government is more a tool than a tool center
and the decentralized autonomous regions. Parliament is supposed to be the holder and the
responsible regional autonomy is made part of the local government more accountable to
central government. Head area, practically speaking, is not determined by the parliament
because the candidates will be chosen by Parliament must get approval first from the center. 
Candidates chosen by the parliament is elected by the central one of which, without being 
tied to the local election results ranking. The view area of the figure head of the desired area
is ignored. Meanwhile, economic injustice, appears when the central government to drain
almost the entire wealth of the region. For example, in Aceh and Riau are rich in natural
resources, but many residents were forced to live in shacks. Meanwhile, because of the poor, 
the gold-rich Irian Jaya, which many people die of hunger, and in Buton which is the largest
producer of asphalt, revealing a picture of the many roads that have not been on the tarmac, at 
least when compared to roads in Java (Mahfud, 2000: 5) . Winasa, then, explains the social
context behind this clutter. He said:
When creating legislation based on the attribution of authority, governments often manipulate and
corrupt the materials, which made the basic principles drowned out by the various implementing 
regulations. This then lead to centralization of power that by time to time became massive and
feudal.
Winasa statement about the culture of feudalism executive can be proved on the 
mechanism of budget planning. Evidence suggests that the budget policy from planning to
implementation is the "play area" the executive, means must be in accordance with the 
guidance center. As expressions of Made Sudantra, Head of Industry, Trade, and
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Cooperatives (Diperindagkop), Jembrana regency, that: "for over thirty years of the executive
that makes the budget plan, in accordance with the interests that represent the center or
centers, without any interference another ". Informants indicate that the policy statement in 
favor of the budget a priority orientation of the central government executive. Meanwhile the
interests of the people were displaced by the interests of other parties who represent the
aspirations of the ruling powers. Although since the 1980's has applied a bottom-up planning 
which is a crawl mechanism for people's aspiration to create a budget plan at the start from
the grassroots level (village). But the reality turned out differently, planning is not 
implemented in earnest, as more colored by the aspirations of executives rather than the 
interests of society. As disclosed Wibawa (2005, 6):
in the planning process ... aspirations often eliminated or at least can only be articulated and
aggregated subtly, for example through direct lobbying from community leaders against the 
government. Their aspirations, the "constitutionally" should be channeled through the institution 
of the House of Representatives (DPRD), in fact it is difficult to be formulated as a policy
accommodated. All the plans made by the president or the government.
If the legislature were consulted, it is just an act to manipulate people (pseudo-
participation), to indicate the occurrence of democracy in the making of policy, especially
fiscal policy, but it was all false. For Winasa, Regent of Jembrana, revealed that:
If during the new order no parliament, then to me it just to show the world that in Indonesia there 
is democracy, but really all it is only a pseudo democracy. They are not empowered at all.
Winasa, added:
New Order stuck on the idea that it should be set aside to build the integration of democracy. The 
new democracy will be opened if the economy is strong. Which underlies the appearance of 
authoritarian rule under Suharto. Democracy is built is a mere formality because the substance of 
democracy is not democratic. There are democratic institutions like Parliament, the House of 
Representatives, parliament, political parties, mass organizations and the press, but all co-opted in 
such a way and pressed not to differ from the view of government. Elections held every five years, 
but with a full engineering process and cheating ... so yes, in the MPR and DPR planted the hands
of political aspirations of the executive so that the container community to be very barren and 
unable to exercise effective control of the government ... This is all built on the basis "for the sake 
of economic development".
The above conditions, with more enthusiasm clarified again by Winasa, that:
There is a crawl aspiration of the people, but who determines the final result is the executive
budget. People's aspirations did not affect the budget that has been made. This makes a very
strong executive position, so that he himself would act arbitrarily, feudalistic, quasi-power and get
his own justification.
This impression reflects the basic character of executives who tend not to want a
consolidation mechanism. Executives wanted to show his power and did not want to share 
power with the legislative especially with the people. Therefore, according to Wibawa (2005, 
5), for the executive to listen to the voice of the people are channeled through the legislature
is something that is impossible, wasting time and inefficient.
Therefore it can be said that, the whole mechanism of planning and managing the 
budget and implemented strictly in accordance with the guidance center. Implemented a 
centralized budget management means the entire result of the economic resources brought to
the central area, then center that determines all the needs of the region. Ironically, there is 
absolutely no resistance to the local government (the executive) to the centralized resource 
management. In fact, local political elites to support this action, because they personally
This page was created using BCL ALLPDF Converter trial software.
To purchase, go to http://store.bcltechnologies.com/productcart/pc/instPrd.asp?idproduct=1
benefit economically, as given discretion to use excessive power over the centralization of 
political and economic support (Pratikno, 2002: 33), and increase career and position in the 
future (Wibawa, 2005: 5).
According to Mills (1999), executive power in the new order seemed an 
implementation of "elite theory". The reason is, because the power was in some group or
certain people, such as executive and his cronies who have no accountability to the people
(Considine, 1983: 139). Based on this theory, the executive gives a greater share of attention
to the opinions of officials upon it in accordance with the hierarchy, rather than the 
aspirations of the legislature. This is in accordance with the opinion expressed by Sudantra, 
Chief Diperindagkop, that:
More preferred are the interests of "center" of the central government and central officials. In 
order to support the continuity of his reign, the center provides a variety of facilities to almost all
indigenous institutions, community leaders and local officials.
This statement describes the behavior of executives (center) who do anything to
please the local officials (the executive), in order to maintain their loyalty. The justification
for this attitude executive produced through imagination about the creation of a just and
prosperous Indonesia, through the symbols of development, political stability, national unity
and uniformity of life for people in every way. As expressions of Dwiyanto (2006, 7) that in 
practice the "elites" manipulate the people with the lure of symbolization, which is in the 
interest of the state, development and national stability.
The symbols above is a form of power that forced in a subtle format that is language, 
according to Pierre Bourdieu in Outline of a Theory of Practice referred to as a form of
symbolic violence (symbolic violence) is a special form of violence using language
mechanisms. Symbols indicate a disguised form of daily activities. According to him (1990, 
xxi), violence is a symbol of violence in its very smooth, the violence imposed on social 
agents without inviting resistance, on the contrary, even invite conformity because it was
getting social legitimacy because its shape is very smooth. The concept of the symbol
violence leads us toward social mechanisms, in which the interlocked relation with the 
communication of power relations. A power system tends to be maintained by dominating
(distorting) the media of communication, the language used in communications, the meanings 
that are exchanged, and the interpretation of the meaning of the meaning, this is called a 
symbol of domination (Thompson, 1984: 42).
In the process of domination actually happens a symbolic force that is very subtle, but 
the man who dominated symbolically unaware of the existence of coercion or accept coercion
as something that is rightfully so. So, language, meaning and symbol systems implanted in 
the minds of the powers of individuals through a mechanism that is hidden from
consciousness. As well as subtly as the central executive to the legislature to impose his 
beliefs and the people through a variety of subtle indoctrination and coercion that the
centralization of all things, including budget policy, is something good, noble and true in 
order for the interest of the state. Meanwhile, those who are controlled / despised as bad, evil, 
guilt, subversive and criminal.
The evidence above shows how the centralization of cultural relations is the new style
of feudalism, and so closely with the executive's behavior. Culture that emphasizes rights
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rather than obligations it has made, "the executive acting as a host rather than a public 
servant. Sadly the situation the new order ", commented Regent of Jembrana, I Gede Winasa.
That is the picture of agency relationship in the context of the budget in the new order
which was highly centralized, reinforced by the culture of feudalism has led to situations 
where the legislature access to the black box budget policy is very limited. Opportunity and
the space owned by the legislature does not go as desired. Thus, extending a relationship that 
does not draw (unequal relationship) between the executive power with the legislative
marginalized. According to financial experts and political imbalances in executive-legislative 
relations raises various problems (see Booth, 1989; Devas, 1989; Thoha, 2005). Therefore, 
this study will explore the agency relationship the new order in the form of a metaphor from 
the point of understanding the various informants, such as the metaphor of "beg the direction
and guidance" and the metaphor of "Rubber Stamp", which is the image of executive-
legislative interaction.
Legislative play: "Please Directives and Instructions"
According to the concept of governance, the legislature elected by the people to 
contribute to providing a critique of accountability and oversight of public financial
management, as well as participating in the system of checks and balances (Santiso and
Belgrano, 2004). This means that the people through the agency overseeing the management
and implementation of the budget which is run by the executive. Light of the agency 
relationship, the legislature elected to act on behalf of the people (the principal). That is, in 
carrying out legislative duties should oversee the agency. All the doings of the executive in
policy-making should always be in the corridor direction and legislative oversight (Mitnick, 
1973; Moe, 1984; Lupia and McCubbins, 2000).
In contrast to the above concept, the new order of government running the concept of 
regional government with reference to the Law no. 5 in 1974, where it is under the legislative
power of the executive (head region) which is an extension of the single authority (the 
President). This condition occurs, since in practice the legislative members are selected in 
advance by a special research process (litsus) which followed closely by executives before
the election, even many of the legislators who are appointed directly by the executive. Some
legislators, who were appointed, were regional civil servants who of course are subordinate to
the head area. So, do not be surprised when it is said legislative positions in the new order is 
subordinate to the executive, so they will do anything to satisfy his superiors.
In budget policy, the executive becomes entitled to institute a super power that
determines all things, both the formulation and determination of budget allocations, while the
legislature did not have space in the process. Legislative position is very weak, can even be
said to be barren. As expressions of Nyusundari Ketut, a member of the legislature, "we are
just accessories rule, do not have any function. All matters are dealt with the executive ". 
When viewed in the context of the above, then surely the legislature did not represent the
public interest, which served only the interests of one person that is a single master.
New order system is made so that "as if" there is democracy that is characterized by 
the existence of the legislature as a counterweight to the executive. However, as noted earlier, 
the "desirability" and "security" legislators in the hands of the head area, even the welfare of 
the legislature in the form of salary and other facilities determined by the regional head. All 
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this led to legislative submissive and obedient to all executive decisions. They do not dare to 
act to carry out their duties, such as validate the rules, give opinions, as well as overseeing the 
budget, if not get the blessing and guidance in advance from the regional head. Therefore, 
any legislative action is always accompanied by the sweet words "ask directions" or "ask 
directions" (Putra and Arif, 2001: 41). As told by Ketut Nyusundari, a member of the 
legislature, that:
At that time, we only approve the budget course, everything depends on the instructions of 
bureaucrats. Therefore, if something is unclear we pray for guidance and direction from the 
executive, before deciding the budget. The executive are the one who determines everything.
He, then, goes on to comment that "many of the legislature who actually visited the 
executive, to ask for opinions on what to do about the budget". This picture shows just how 
dependent the legislative to the executive, both material and non material. Metaphorical 
description of legislative action that is always "ask directions" or "ask directions" reinforced 
by a culture of paternalism that developed in the concept of Javanese society, a form of 
relationship "father" and "son" (Kuntowijoyo, 2004; Dwiyanto, 2006). In the hierarchy, the 
one who occupy the top position acts as a father and the subordinate acts as children. That is, 
the culture of paternalism see the executive as the father as occupying the top positions and 
legislative acts as a "child". The relationship between parent and child is the superior and 
inferior relationships. Children or inferiors must respect the parentsor superiors. As the 
"father", the executive provides protection to "children" in the form of his status and rank 
with all amenities. Giving is a privilege "child" which is a determinant of social status in 
society. Consequently, by granting privileges, then the "child" must be loyal and voluntarily 
fulfill all the commandments "father" who later became a source of legitimacy of power in 
society (Mulder, 1985: 23). In relation to the "father" and "child", each party to get his wish 
so hard to say who is blackmailing whom or who take advantage of anyone (Jackson and Pye, 
1978: 34).
This picture shows the new order with a culture of paternalism is very involved in
executive-legislative relations agency. Culture of paternalism is reinforced with a system of
feudalism in the form of centralization of power led to the legislative body that should
oversee the implementation of the executive budget, reversed into the executive who oversees
and controls the legislature in making budget policy. The powerlessness of the legislature in 
carrying out his rights in order to realize its functions led to a very weak position of
Parliament, they just act as a "rubber stamp", as the following explanation.
"Rubber Stamp": Marginalized Legislative Work
"Rubber Stamp"! This Meaning is what the researchers captured from the interaction
with the informant when they described the role of the new order legislature. As the view of
one of the staff of local government that describes how easily the proposed executive budget 
proposal for approval by Parliament, because these institutions are only approve the budget
and rules without a lot of questions. As Vishnu's comments, one of the former member of
parliament of the new order era, that:
I think it is very clear that our position are only appendages of a system built by the government's new 
order, back then, we have no power at all, we were just called to sit down, shut up, listen and ultimately
approve all the proposal of the executive ... I think the role is similar to a rubber stamp, we are there to
legitimize the government's wishes.
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The powerlessness of the legislature, appears to be supported by the social order
(social settings) that is authoritarian or neo-feudalism is backed by the military. The 
powerlessness of the legislature is due to the strong position of the central government (the 
president).
When investigated again, the accumulation of power in the hands of regional 
executives in the New Order era (the period between 1966 until mid-1999) is an outcome of 
the executive power (president) at the country level. President (Suharto) as head of the 
executive branch has enormous power and dominant, so called as the sole ruler. In running 
the government received support from the dominant political force and military power. This 
impression is captured from the comments Winasa, Regent of Jembrana, that "the 
government bureaucracy in Indonesia is military power and Golkar". Both these powers abide 
and obedient to the President, in governance they have a huge impact on every level of 
government to the remote villages. As noted by Priyatmoko (2005, 85) that, "not just 
supervision that was carried out, but further than that, strategic positions in government was 
capitalized by the new order for the ruling regime occupied by military personnel".
In fact, a strategic position to be occupied by civil society as much as possible the 
military contributed to selecting, for example through the mechanism of special study or the 
obligation to follow certain courses, such as the Nation Defense. Furthermore, Priyatmoko
(2005, 85) and Pratikno (2002, 33) added that central and local officials who have occupied
positions are also influenced by a variety of ways, such as coordination or upgrading, 
upgrading by using symbols of unity, national stability, in order to benefit state and
development. Under these circumstances Winasa Regent, later, joked that:
Even almost all the regional head and chief or head of strategic agencies were in the hands of the 
military. Democracy which puts people's sovereignty is not much practiced. Meanwhile, democracy, 
according to a perspective of power nuanced by engineering for the benefit of the ruler was very clear 
during the reign of the new order.
From the above comprehension it appears that the role of Golkar and the military have been
displacing the position of the legislature. Legislature cannot exercise its function as a
representative of the people in determining the policies of the budget. All these functions
have been carried out by subordinates President who was in the Golkar party and military. On 
the other hand, the position of the legislature as a symbol of the supremacy of civilian
institutions which are supposed to represent the people in the political arena of governance 
and budget management were displaced by the role of the armed forces, which represent the 
aspirations of the ruler. This Form of authoritarian control model was run strictly by placing 
the hierarchy of government aligned with the hierarchy of the territorial command, so the
military can observe at close the governance at every level down to villages.
The situation is worsened by the threat of recall for legislators vowel (voiced public 
interest), conducted by the executive (Fuad, 2000: 24). As expressed by Nyoman Suryadi, 
Head of Education Jembrana, that, "if there is a legislative who talk too much will be 
replaced by others, for blocking the budget approval that “was said" to impede development.
Budget approval should run smoothly and instantly approved, in which all orders come from 
above ". Based on this understanding, executives tend to avoid legislative that are critical of
any policy that has been made, because they tends to create work inefficiencies.
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On the other hand, in the new order, the executive agency was filled by scholars or the
selected priyayi community, so that the executive branch has established itself as a pioneer of
modernization, or consider themselves (and are considered by society) as the most knowing, 
most competent and most capable to formulate policies that will be achieved and the best for 
the community. Jero Gede, customary village chief, commented that: "The executive of the 
new order era was filled with smart people and intellect. So don’t be surprised if they decide
everything ". This way of view was embedded and rooted in a long period of time, which is 
then institutionalized as a system that is difficult to change. As expressed by Foucault that 
there is an inseparable relation between discourses, the underlying knowledge, as well as
relations of power hidden behind it, which is a product of the practice of power. According to 
him, action, knowledge and discourse formation is a product of the power play (Piliang, 
2004: 223-224). This means that the discourse of modernization and the executive as a
pioneer institution that knows all things deliberately developed and implanted a long time by 
the authorities in order to perpetuate power.
In line with that in mind, C. Wright Mills in his work "The Power Elite" (1956) 
pointed out that the power to control and lead the activities of people is concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of people (Sanderson, 2003: 330). They are an elite choice of 
homogeneous and united, which is at the top of the pyramid of society. The members of the 
elite from the three main areas of life, which are executive, large employers, and top military 
leaders. "Elite" so named by Mills, is a "military-industrial complex". Regardless of the 
diversity of members of the elite who have been pushed into a variety of often conflicting 
interests, Mills saw them as the holder of a fundamental unit of interest. The similarity of 
fundamental importance that it has created a psychological unity of the group, with the result 
of ideological unity of the world view of social, political, and economic. They became a 
group that supports the ruling elites in control of the state.
In addition, the exclusivity of the executive seems supported by the device
information which is controlled entirely by the executive, while the legislature is very poor 
on information. According to Santiso and Belgrano (2004, 6):
The executive branch overwhelmingly dominates the budget process and legislatures tend to act merely as 
rubber stamps. Excessive executive discretion in public budgeting has not only hindered the consolidation of
mechanisms of self-restraint in budget policy making, but also has circumvented of neutralized the few that 
existed.
Therefore, it can be said that in this era, executives do not want to share information with 
legislators because it is an indispensable ingredient in preparing arguments for the
formulation of budget policy. As is known, completeness, accuracy and timeliness of data is 
an expensive"stuff", therefore in each of the sessions of the discussion of budget policy
agenda, the legislature can not give arguments as well as the executive (head area). This 
condition causes the legislature at the time of the trial only give agreement comments, 
without any criticism. For this, Made Sudantra, one of the Head of Jembrana, said that "the
situation at that time was that the legislature just stamps it". So the expression as a "rubber 
stamp" arises, because these institutions were only providing stamp endorsement on the 
policy proposals put forward by the executive budget (Wibawa, 2005: 13).
In other words, the view that the leadership has always acted properly, the leader
cannot be blamed, for so long has been built. Conversely, a subordinate is considered not able 
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to translate the desire of the leader and the various attitudes that marginalize subordinates
continue to be developed. As a result, the legislature in making budget policy endorsed only
what is already formulated by the executive. Therefore, a rubber stamp inherent in the 
legislative body was a fact that must be accepted. As expressed by Made Sudantra, showing 
the marginalization of legislature was "budget approval was not hard, because it was only 
passed directly and no questions were asked by the legislature".
Thus the institutional executive-legislative relations, as described above, continuously
take place during the three decades that tend to be the target of power, and eventually began 
to feel the need for reform. Efforts to reform gave birth to a desire to try to introduce a
paradigm model of relationship form that is more nurturing the society. This paradigm wants 
to return the voice of the people which is channeled through legitimate institutions under the 
laws of the legislature.
ERA NEW ORDER: THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES THAT
PROMOTE RELATIONS AGENCY
The above description shows that the government new order deserves to be called an
authoritarian and militaristic government. Authoritarian and militaristic government were the 
one reinforce and enforced by the feudal life style and paternalistic, or paternalism, which
traditionally applies in the Indonesian society in general.
In such cases, ethnicity and religious beliefs as a social and political force are 
maintained and developed by the government to support the stability of the new order of 
government and authorities has consciously or not shift into support for the stability of 
President Suharto and his cronies. It was later developed as the powers are absolute
individuals, which is concentrated in the hands of one person (President Soeharto and his 
family). Absolute power is corrupt power, whether social, economic, political, and moral. For 
that reason, justification (justification) or the justifications made by using symbols (unity, 
development, stability and justice) and the metaphors which are relevant by officials in both
religious ceremonies and social rituals.
In the new order era there is no equality of agency relationship, there is a social
hierarchy or hierarchy established through various forms of regulation and political policies, 
as well as the provision of facilities and privileges to the military, officials and bureaucrats, 
and the parties supporting the government. As the result, we can be clearly distinguished
between the ruling (with different privileges), people with no authority or ordinary people
(who have to serve the ruling).
In the new order there is no equality agencies, both socially, legally or law, and
culture. Inequality is manifested mainly in the political and economic life of the citizens of 
Indonesia. Although Indonesia recognizes itself as a democracy, the Western world and a 
number of other countries classifies Indonesia as a country with a totalitarian government, the 
same s type with countries in Latin America is also controlled by the military (Piliang, 2005). 
The main principle of democracy, namely the degree of individual equality and freedom, and
the ruler with the consent of the people, not materialized during the reign of the new order. 
During the New Order era, that there is rule by the military, the patron or father, and cronies
of the president. They see shades of the new order era of Indonesian culture as a culture are
This page was created using BCL ALLPDF Converter trial software.
To purchase, go to http://store.bcltechnologies.com/productcart/pc/instPrd.asp?idproduct=1
feudalistic, authoritarian, militaristic, and paternalistic economic system that is supported by
cronyism.
Agency relationship that goes on in the new order era regardless of his physical
achievements is remarkable, in fact nothing more than a discourse of madness. As Foucault
said, in the madness of people deceive themselves. If true a false image of the insane
demands (arbitrariness of image), so he imprisons himself in the circle false consciousness. 
Insanity is the fragmentation of the soul, where the passion brought to the point of blindness. 
It is blindness that has guided trips construction of the new order regime. Accompanied by an 
uncontrollable desire to blindness will lead everyone to the Machiavellian. The paradigm of 
violence eventually became the paradigm of development. Agency relationship that occurs is 
supported by calculations, calculation and management of precision, but not fitted with a 
healthy soul (reason). Agency relationship demanded not by the wisdom and sincerity, but by 
the desires and passions that there is no control. Projects that are built based more on a desire
to meet the desires of pride and prestige of the ruler, like the tallest, most luxurious shopping
center, the largest golf course, and so on. The passion of pride, therefore is in contradiction 
with the social conditions and aspirations, in the end be a boomerang and killed the nation 
itself through various forms of violence.
Agency relationship in the era of the new order is characterized by territorial or
geopolitical politics, which has created a cultural totalitarianism, the culture of centralized
power, centralized, which created in it various forms of cultural uniformity that does not 
respect plurality, difference, and the locality. Culture is constructed based on the principle of
binary opposition. Within each segment is a process of elimination (exclusion), isolation 
(alienation), and exclusion (marginalization). From the description above, we can say that the
new order era of logo-centrism is selfishness. That is, only the executive (center) is always 
true.
It can be seen that during the New Order era, the climate of dialogue is not created, 
there is a man seen as a statistic, as the numbers, as a commodity that does not consider her 
feelings. This way of thinking is contrary to Mikhail Bakhtin who argued that attempts an 
understanding of society and culture (including political culture), the most important effort is 
to understand how human beings as subjects, with all his feelings, and not as soulless objects. 
Because, as an object, only knowledge that can be obtained (Piliang, 2005, 182). Therefore, 
in an agency relationship, the most important thing to understand is an understanding
between agents and principals.
SUMMARY
Executive-legislative relations agency in the context of the budget is like a mystery of
budget management in the new order, because the relationship is dominated by the executive
agency. Legislative access to budget policy’s “black box” is very limited, or even, none at all.
In addition, the system in such a way as to make the new order "as if" there is
democracy that is characterized by the existence of the legislature as a counterweight to the 
executive. However, because of "security" legislators in the hands of the head area, causing
the legislature to be submissive and obedient to all executive decisions. Therefore, every 
action must always be accompanied by the sweet words "please landing" or "please clue", as 
a result of legislative work only as a "rubber stamp" or "rubber stamp" the budget, there are 
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no other jobs. Apparently, that was the most appropriate metaphor to describe the role of the 
legislature the new order.
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